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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature of the Case 
 
Appellant John Douglas, hereinafter Mr. Douglas and/or Appellant,  
appeals following a jury trial  from  convictions for first degree murder. 
First, Mr. Douglas asserts a Batson violation, as he is African American, 
and the only African American on the jury pool was stricken by the state with a 
peremptory challenge.  
Second, Mr. Douglas asserts that he was denied access to his retained 
counsel located in Philadelphia because he was limited to only an hour per day 
access to the phone at a rotating time and was largely unable to reach his 
attorney.   
Third, Mr. Douglas asserts the court erred by denying his motion for 
mistrial after a police officer gave a double hearsay non-responsive answer that   
a DEA agent from back East said a CI connected Mr. Douglas with the Boise 
murder.   
Course of Proceedings 
On July 24, 2014, a complaint was filed charging Mr. Douglas with two 
counts of first degree murder and one count of attempted first degree murder. (R. 
20-22.)  Mr. Douglas was ultimately arrested and then arraigned on November 
25, 2014. (R. p. 30.)  
While the public defender was initially appointed, retained counsel from 
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, substituted in pro hac vice along with local retained 
counsel. (R. p. 62, 65-66, 67.) 
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The state moved to consolidate the case with that of Anthony Robins who 
had been charged under a separate case number with aiding and abetting Mr. 
Douglas on all three counts.  (R. p. 75.)  The court granted the motion to 
consolidate.  (R. p. 75.)  Mr. Robins later unsuccessfully moved for relief from 
prejudicial joinder. (R. p. 187-188.) 
After a preliminary hearing, Mr. Douglas was bound over to the district 
court, and an information was filed charging him with the same crimes as in the 
complaint.   (R. p. 125, 133-135.) 
Co-defendant Robins also filed a Motion to Compel Access to Counsel 
because the jail was limiting his telephone access to one hour per day, 
sometimes outside of business hours. (R. p. 268-269.) Mr. Douglas joined in the 
motion. (R. p. 279-280.)  After a hearing the court denied the motion. (R. p. 305.) 
This ruling will be discussed below. 
The matter proceeded to jury trial with Mr. Douglas and co-defendant 
Robins being tried together.  He was found guilty as charged (as was co-
defendant Robins). (R. p. 502.) 
Mr. Douglas was sentenced to fixed life in prison on each of the murder 
counts, to run concurrent, and 15 years fixed on the attempted murder count also 
to run concurrent.  (R. p.  518-519.)  




Statement of the Facts  
  While the cases of Mr. Douglas and co-defendant Robins were 
consolidated below, they are not consolidated on appeal.1   Since co-defendant 
Robins has succinctly described the trial evidence in his already filed brief, 
Appellant will simply reiterate the relevant portions of his statement of facts (with 
citations to Mr. Douglas’ record).  
The state’s theory at trial was that Samari Winn (who was tried separately) 
led Mr. Douglas to the home of Bailey and Calloway, and that Mr. Douglas shot 
and killed them and also shot Jeanette Juraska, who survived.  Mr. Robins, 
according to the state, was the organizer of the murder plot and driver.  The 
motive was that Bailey and Calloway were suspected of stealing 30 pounds of 
marijuana from the house that Mr. Winn, Anton Raider, and Mr. Robins rented.  
Mr. Robins lived in California and supplied Mr. Raider with marijuana.  Mr. Raider 
denied any direct involvement in the shootings.  He testified in support of the 
state’s theory in exchange for substantial benefits in both state and federal 
courts.  The defense was that Mr. Raider was the victim of the marijuana theft, 
had the motive to kill Bailey and Calloway, and was the one who drove to and 
from the house in his van.  Mr. Raider admitted he provided the murder weapon, 
ammunition, and the van, and even admitted to buying bleach and power 
washing the interior of the van after the shootings.  (Tr. 1/19/2016,  p. 193-214; p. 
215-227; p. 228-237 (opening statements).) 
                                            
1 Mr. Robins’ case is Docket No. 49226. 
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Mr. Douglas’ further defense was that there was absolutely no physical 
evidence (the best kind of evidence because it does not lie according to his 
lawyer) tying  Mr. Douglas to the crime. (Tr. 1/19/2016,  p. 217, ln. 14—p. 218, ln. 
14.)  Rather, the state’s case was based only on the worst possible types of 
evidence: eyewitness and snitch. Mr. Douglas also contended it was Mr. Raider 
who was the guilty party who was blaming others. (Tr. 1/19/2016,  p. 221, ln. 4—
p. 222, ln. 14.) The only other thing tying Mr. Douglas to the crime was an 
eyewitness identification by Jeanette Juraska. However, her opportunity to 
observe was bad, as she had used narcotics and alcohol that day, and most 
importantly, she did not initially identify Mr. Douglas and instead told police she 
did not know who it was and did not get a good look.  (Tr. 1/19/2016,  p. 219, ln. 
1—p. 221, ln. 3.) 
 The significant trial evidence follows: 
Aileen Browud, a neighbor of the victims, saw two men get out of Mr. 
Raider’s van and walk down the street.  She then heard gunfire.  (Tr. 1/19/2016,  
p. 246, ln. 8 – p. 247, ln. 13.)  She could not identify the ethnicity of either man.  
(Tr. 1/19/2016,  p. 253, ln. 19-23.)  She did testify that they were in shape, which 
Mr. Douglas, a large man, was undisputedly not. (Tr. 1/19/2016, p. 256, ln. 25—
p. 259, ln. 24.) However, another neighbor, Matt Jamison, also heard the gunfire 
and saw the two men, one black and the other white quickly leaving the scene.  
(Tr. 1/19/2016,  p. 267, ln. 2 - p. 268, ln. 2; p. 293, ln. 2-25; p. 295, ln. 5-20.)  He 
then saw Mr. Raider’s van leaving.  (Tr. 1/19/2016,  p.  268, ln. 4-8; p. 270, ln. 2-
14.)  Mr. Winn, Mr. Douglas, and Mr. Robins are all black.  (Exhibits 125-127.)  
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Mr. Raider is the only white person among the possible participants.  (Exhibits 
73, 119.)      
 Ms. Juraska, the girlfriend of one of the decedents, testified that the 
doorbell rang and she opened the door.  Mr. Winn and Mr. Douglas were on the 
porch.  She testified that Mr. Douglas entered and shot everyone.  She called 
911.  (Tr. 1/22/2016,  p. 40, ln. 12- p. 45, ln. 13.)  She had met Mr. Douglas in 
California a few months prior, but did not immediately identify him as the shooter.  
(Tr. 1/22/2016, p. 54, ln. 5 - p. 57, ln. 22; p. 168, ln. 4 - p. 169, ln. 13.)  She later 
picked a photograph of Mr. Douglas out of a montage and identified him in court. 
(Tr. 1/22/2016, p.  60, ln. 8 - p. 61, ln. 19; p. 62, ln. 4-16.)   
 Mr. Raider put the blame on Mr. Robins for organizing the shooting and 
driving his van.  The defense was that Mr. Raider was the organizer/driver as he 
had the motive, the means, and the opportunity.  (Tr. 1/19/2016,  p. 236, ln. 15 - 
p. 237, ln. 4.) 
 Mr. Raider explained that he sold drugs and that Mr. Robins was his 
supplier.  (Tr. 1/25/2016,  p. 9, ln. 1-25.)  Mr. Raider and Mr. Winn lived in a 
rented house in Boise.  Mr. Robins also had a room there, although his residence 
was in California.   (Tr. 1/25/2016,  p. 20, ln. 16-23.)    One day in late October of 
2013, a woman delivered two roller bags containing 30 pounds of marijuana to 
the house.  Mr. Raider said he placed them in Mr. Robins’ room because “it’s not 
my weed or it’s not – they are not my suitcases.”  (Tr. 1/25/2016,  p. 28, ln. 13 - 
p. 30, ln. 8.)   Mr. Raider claimed that the roller bags were stolen on October 31, 
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while he was out attending to business and partying.  (Tr. 1/25/2016,  p. 31, ln. 
17 - p. 32, ln. 12.) 
 According to Mr. Raider, Mr. Robins suspected Bailey and Calloway were 
the thieves, and Mr. Robins told him that they would not be able to handle the 
situation right then, but would resolve it later, and that Mr. Robins was interested 
in purchasing one of his handguns.  (Tr. 1/25/2016,  p. 35, ln. 6-18.)   Mr. Raider 
testified that Mr. Robins told him that “Big Man would be coming into town to 
handle the situation . . . and that he was interested in purchasing one of my 
handguns.”  (Tr. 1/25/2016,  p. 40, ln. 9-12.)   With that knowledge, Mr. Raider 
agreed to sell a .45 caliber handgun and agreed to buy ammunition for it, which 
he did at Cabelas. (Tr. 1/25/2016,  p. 40, ln. 13-19; p. 41, ln. 19-23.)  After 
retrieving the pistol from his mom’s house, cleaning it, providing the ammunition 
and magazines for it,  and driving Mr. Douglas around to look for Bailey and 
Calloway, Mr. Raider claimed that he “told them I didn’t really want anything to do 
with any of it.”  (Tr. 1/25/2016,  p. 43, ln. 20—p. 44, ln. 5;  p. 45, ln. 7—p. 46, ln. 
9;  p. 47, ln. 3-4.)   Even so, Mr. Raider admitted he then drove Mr. Winn and Mr. 
Douglas to scout the house. (Tr. 1/25/2016,  p. 48, ln. 5-12.) 
 Mr. Robins arrived in Boise the next day. Mr. Raider testified that he left 
the house to go to a barbeque, but came back to clear out his “weed and the 
guns . . .  just in case” the police came after the shootings. (Tr. 1/25/2016,  p. 51, 
ln. 23 - p. 53, ln. 1.)  But instead of doing that, he gave the van key to Mr. Robins.  
(Tr. 1/25/2016,  p. 53, ln. 9-13.)  Mr. Raider said that the others left in the van 
and he went into his room, “rolled a joint and sat down.”   (Tr. 1/25/2016,  p.  54, 
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ln. 6-7.)  About 20-30 minutes later they returned.  Mr. Raider noticed his van 
was missing, but did not ask where it was; instead he “went back into [his] room . 
. . to go finish the joint[.]” (Tr. 1/25/2016,  p. 54, ln. 15-22.)  Mr. Raider said that 
Mr. Robins and Mr. Douglas then went to a strip club.  Mr. Winn rode his bike 
back to the van, retrieved the murder weapon, threw it into a dumpster, rode 
back to the house, and called for a cab.  Mr. Raider left the house on his 
motorcycle and went to his friends’ house where he “hung out and smoked weed, 
just chilled.”  (Tr. 1/25/2016,  p. 58, ln. 18 - p. 61, ln. 12.)  The next day, Mr. 
Raider located the van, cleaned it out with bleach “and then drove it to a car 
wash and pressure washed the inside of it.”  (Tr. 1/25/2016,  p.  71, ln. 9-12.)  He 
was photographed at the hardware store buying the bleach.  (Exhibit 73.)  While 
Mr. Raider claimed that Mr. Robins told him where the van was located during a 
telephone call, his cell phone records did not show such a call.  (Tr. 1/26/2016,  
p.  73, ln. 11—p. 75, ln. 22; Exhibits 76, C.)   
 It was unfortunate for Mr. Raider that he did not clear out his house as he 
intended because it was later searched by the police.  As a result, he was 
charged in federal court with possession of marijuana and with possession of a 
weapon in connection with a drug crime.  Due to his cooperation in this case, he 
received a five-year sentence in federal court.  In addition, he pleaded guilty to 
aiding and abetting first-degree murder in state court in exchange for a 
concurrent five-year sentence.  Thus, his total time served was not increased by 
his admitted participation in the murders.  (Tr. 1/25/2016,  p.  76, ln. 6 - p. 77, ln. 
16; p. 146, ln. 1-2.)   
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 Mr. Robins argued Mr. Raider was putting the blame on him for what Mr. 
Raider had actually done.  He argued that it was Mr. Raider’s marijuana which 
was stolen, that Mr. Raider was mad at Bailey and Calloway for stealing it, that it 
was Mr. Raider’s van that transported Mr. Winn and Mr. Douglas to their house, 
that it was Mr. Raider’s gun and bullets which killed them, that Mr. Raider was 
the only white person at the crime scene, and it was Mr. Raider who retrieved 
and cleaned the van afterward. (Tr. 1/25/2016,  p. 154, ln. 9 - p. 156, ln. 14.)     
 The state also presented evidence that Mr. Robins and Mr. Douglas took a 
circuitous route back to their respective homes driving from Boise to Seattle and 
then to Mr. Robins’ home in Fremont, CA.  Mr. Douglas then flew from Portland 
to his home in Pennsylvania.  (Exhibit 143.) 
 A jail house letter written by Mr. Douglas to Mr. Robins was admitted, over 
objection. This letter was stolen from Mr. Douglas by another jail inmate and was 
never received by Mr. Robins.   In the letter, Mr. Douglas explains to Mr. Robins 
the story that Mr. Robins needs to tell his lawyer about what happened, which 
was that Mr. Douglas told Mr. Robins that he committed the murders and that 
everything Mr. Raider said that Mr. Robins did was instead done by Mr. Raider.  
Mr. Douglas was willing to take the fall and plead guilty and support Mr. Robins’ 
defense.  (Exhibit 133.)  The state argued to the jury that the letter was untrue 
and the actual truth was the opposite of what the letter said. (Tr. 1/25/2016, p. 
257, ln. 8—p. 260, ln. 12.) While the state argued that the entire story proposed 
by Mr. Douglas in the letter was untrue, it actually considered the letter to be a 
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The one African American in the jury pool was removed when the state 
exercised a peremptory strike. Mr. Douglas asserts the court erred in denying his 
Batson challenge. 
B. Standard of review and discriminatory peremptory challenge law 
The Idaho Court of Appeals succinctly set forth the general law regarding 
racially discriminatory peremptory challenges in State v. Foster, 152 Idaho 88 
(Ct.App. 2011): 
In Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S. Ct. 1712, 90 L. Ed. 2d 
69 (1986), the United States Supreme Court held that  
discriminatory use of peremptory challenges to exclude persons 
from jury service on account of their race is a violation of Equal 
Protection Clause of the United States Constitution.   Batson 
dictates  that a trial court, when faced with an assertion that a party 
has exercised a peremptory challenge in a discriminatory fashion, 
must apply the following three-part test. First, the party objecting to 
the peremptory challenge must make a prima facie showing that 
the challenge was exercised on the basis of race. To establish a 
prima facie case of discrimination, the defendant must show that 
the challenged prospective juror is a member of a cognizable racial 
group and that the prosecutor exercised peremptory challenges to 
remove from the jury members of the defendant's race. Cognizable 
or identifiable racial groups are those which have historically been 
subjected to discriminatory treatment and have from time-to-time 
required aid from the courts in securing equal treatment under the 
law. For the purpose of applying the Batson equal protection 
analysis, a person of African American descent is a member of a 
cognizable racial group.  
Second, if the prima facie showing is made, the burden shifts to the 
party attempting to  exercise the peremptory challenge to articulate 
a race-neutral explanation for its decision. It is not enough for the 
state to represent that he or she did not exercise its challenges on 
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an impermissible basis; the state must provide a clear and 
reasonably specific explanation of legitimate reasons for exercising 
the challenges. . . .   
Finally, if a race-neutral explanation is given for the peremptory 
challenge, the trial court must determine whether the party 
attacking the peremptory challenge has met its burden of proving 
purposeful discrimination based on race. In deciding if the 
defendant has carried the burden of persuasion, a trial court must 
undertake a sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct 
evidence of intent as may be available.  . . .  
The party asserting   discriminatory use of a peremptory challenge 
bears the ultimate burden of persuasion and must show that 
purposeful discrimination was, in fact, the basis for use of the 
peremptory challenge. The trial court's finding with regard to the 
state's explanation will be overturned on appeal only if it is clearly 
erroneous in light of the facts as a whole.  
Id. p. 90-92 (internal citations omitted). 
As to the standards of review for the three-part inquiry, the Idaho Court of 
Appeals explained as follows in State v. Ornelas, 159 Idaho 394 (Ct. App. 2015): 
. . . Appellate review of the second step of the Batson analysis is 
reviewed de novo. When we review a trial court's decision under 
the third step of the Batson analysis, that decision will only be 
overturned if the trial court's findings are "clearly erroneous in light 
of the facts as a whole." Factual findings are  clearly erroneous 
"only when unsupported by substantial and competent evidence." . 
. . 
 
Id. at p. 395-396 (internal citations omitted). 
 
 Also relevant to the instant case is when a strike is based both on 
permissible and impermissible grounds. 
In the first appeal [State v. Ornelas, 156 Idaho 727 (Ct. App. 2014)], 
we determined that Ornelas satisfied the second step because the 
State did not strike Juror 24 with a solely gender-neutral purpose as 
the prosecutor offered both "permissible" and "impermissible" 
reasons for striking Juror 24. During voir dire, the State exercised 
its peremptory challenges and struck Juror 24, who is a male. The 
State argued that this juror was excused due to his age (twenty-four 
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years old), his lack of life experiences, and the concern that he 
would be unable to identify with the victims because his child was 
only one year old. These are considered permissible grounds for 
the State to exercise a peremptory challenge because these 
statements, on their face, do not invoke race or gender. However, 
the prosecutor also indicated that a peremptory challenge was used 
to remove Juror  24 in order to empanel an additional female on the 
jury, and this statement is at issue in the Batson challenge because 
on its face, it invokes gender as the basis for striking the juror from 
the jury panel. This is considered an impermissible basis under the 
Batson analysis. Because we determined that striking Juror 24 was 
based on both permissible and impermissible grounds, the second 
step of the analysis was satisfied. 
We determined that in a case such as this, where there are both 
permissible and impermissible reasons presented to strike a juror 
and the second Batson step is satisfied, the analysis must continue 
to the third Batson step. The third step requires the district court to 
determine "if the peremptory strike was motivated in substantial 
part by discriminatory intent." We held that "if the peremptory strike 
was motivated in substantial part by discriminatory intent, the 
challenger has met his burden of showing purposeful 
discrimination." Id. At this stage of the analysis, the district court 
must determine whether the prosecutor's explanations are credible, 
and the "proffered rationale has some basis in accepted trial 
strategy." The district court can consider various   kinds of evidence 
to determine whether the prosecutor has acted with discriminatory 
intent, including a comparison of the jurors' responses to voir dire 
questions, voir dire notes, as well as the prosecutor's recollection of 
the characteristics of a specific juror such as "attitude, attention, 
interest, body language, facial expression and eye contact." That is, 
when a court engages in the comparative juror analysis, it should 
do so with an inclusive record. 
Id. p.  396 (internal citations omitted).  
 
 
C. The instant challenge and the court’s ruling 
There was a pretrial conference on the Friday before the trial to start the 
next week.  There, the state challenged for cause based on actual bias, two 
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members of the venire, one of which was the only African American in the  
venire, Juror 55.2 (Tr. 1/15/2016, p. 116, ln. 21—p. 117, ln. 8.)  
. . . And from the State’s perspective, in several places number 55 
clearly indicates that she is partial. She is not an impartial juror. 
And I point the court specifically first to page 11 of her 
questionnaire at the very top in subparagraph C where’s she asked: 
Do you feel the burden of proof should be greater than beyond a 
reasonable doubt, such as proof beyond any possible doubt or 
proof to an absolute certainty? And she says: Yes. People get 
wrongly convicted all the time.  
 
That’s clearly a state of mind in which she is showing a bias and 
indicates the burden should be higher despite being told it’s not.  
 
In addition, on page 13 when she’s asked: Do you have any 
opinions about law enforcement officers that might affect your 
ability to impartially evaluate the testimony of an officer during trial? 
Answer: Yes. They are unfair to black people.  
 
So in light of the fact that the makeup—the ethnic makeup of our 
two defendants are African American, clearly it’s an issue in this 
case.  
 
Now, if she said unfair to blacks and we did not have African 
American gentlemen on trial, it would be a different situation. But 
clearly she’s biased. 
 
Lastly, she appears to be physically unavailable and indicates to 
you that that she is going to be unable to focus because she takes 
her dad to chemo every Friday.  
 
On—specifically on  page 13 at the bottom, number 16, she says: I 
take my dad to chemo every Friday and I will not be able to focus.  
 
So, from the State’s perspective, that’s an additional problem. 
 
Tr. 1/15/2016, p. 117, ln. 19—p. 118, ln. 24. 
 
                                            
2 While the prosecutor stated on the record that she was making the relevant 
juror packets part of the record for appeal, it does not appear to have been done, 





  The defense argued that actual bias could not be determined simply by 
the questionnaires.  Further, for Juror 55, she was the only potential juror in the 
pool that shared the same race as the defendants. Also, while she may have 
articulated some opinions that may be construed as anti-law enforcement, her 
son was an ISP trooper.  There was nothing about the questionnaire that 
indicated that she could not follow the court’s instructions. Finally, defense 
counsel argued that it was premature to strike her and she should be questioned 
on these points. (Tr. 1/15/2016, p. 120, ln. 21—p. 123, ln. 7.)  In rebuttal, the 
state requested that the two jurors be questioned privately so they did not taint 
the entire pool and afterwards the state could renew its motion to strike for 
cause. (Tr. 1/15/2016, p. 125, ln. 11-20.)  
 The court ruled there was nothing showing their bias and denied the 
motion to strike for cause for both jurors, but stated it would allow their private 
questioning.  (Tr. 1/15/2016, p. 126, ln. 22—p. 127, ln. 27.) 
The next week at  the beginning of voir dire, the court took up requests to 
be excused for hardship. Juror number 55  explained to the court that she had to 
take her 89 year old father to chemotherapy every Friday and she did not have 
anyone else to do it. It was unknown whether the jury commissioner was able to 
provide someone to transport him.   (Tr. 1/19/2016, p. 8, ln. 8-25.)  The court 
mentioned that it intended to take every other Friday off, but that the case could 
involve two Fridays.  Juror 55 explained that she would have to find someone 
else to take him but she did not have anyone else at that moment. (Tr. 
1/19/2016, p. 9, ln. 4-11.)   
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When asked whether she could devote her full attention to the case or 
whether she would be distracted, Jury 55 stated: 
A. I’ll say somewhat because based on his age, it’s best for me 
to go with him. He is 89 years old, and I just need to be there to 
hear everything that is going on with him.  
Tr. 1/19/2016, p. 9, ln. 15-18. 
Jury 55 confirmed that she stayed with her father the whole time and 
communicated with the health care providers. (Tr. 1/19/2016, p. 9, ln. 15-25.) 
The following exchange occurred: 
Q. Ma’am, are you asking to be excused from the jury based on 
that hardship? 
 
A. I am.  I mean, if I could get someone to take him, I would love to 
be here, but I can’t guarantee that until—unless I am chosen. I’m 
sorry.  
 
Q. In the past ten days or so since we filled out the questionnaire, 
have you tried to find somebody who might  be able to help with 
that? 
 
A.  I was actually hoping that I would get a call on Friday and since 
I didn’t—I’m sorry—I didn’t really look for one. But if I need to find 
someone, I will. I’ll try.  
 
Q. All right. Wes, would you or Jim be able to go talk to Margie in 
the commissioner’s office to see if that’s something we can 
accommodate? 
 
Tr. 1/19/2016, p. 10, ln. 1-15. 
After the court had questioned the entire panel, the prosecutor asked the 
following questions of Juror 55:  
Could you pass to 55. Hi. You indicated and talked to us a little bit 
about your dad. Now. I kind of took from your questionnaire that 
you may have moved here specifically to take care of him, right? 
A. No. I was born here. 
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Q. Oh, you were born here. I thought you came from  South 
Carolina. 
A. We lived there briefly. 
Q. So did you grow up in Idaho? 
A. Uh-huh. 
Q. Now, can you help me understand?  One of the things you put 
on your questionnaire is you were going to have a hard time 
focusing. You wrote: I will have a hard time focusing  on the trial 
with your dad not having me there on Fridays, which I completely 
understand.  
Do you still feel like you would have trouble focusing if they made 
arrangements for somebody to go with him?  
A. Probably, because they’re not going to tell me everything I need 
to know what’s going on.  
Q. And so I hear you saying you’re going to have a hard time 
focusing. Would it be  on the testimony and the exhibits that are 
being presented that you would have a hard time focusing on?  
A. Only on the Fridays when I take him. 
Q. But you would be like 100 percent on the rest of the days? 
A. That is correct. 
Q. All right. Thank you very much. 
Tr. 1/19/2016, p. 50, ln. 1—p. 51, ln. 4. 
Neither the state nor the defense wanted individual or private questioning 
of Juror 55. (Tr. 1/19/2016, p. 59, ln. 22—p. 60, ln. 4.) 
After the exercising of the peremptory challenges, Mr. Robins brought 
(joined in by Mr. Douglas) a Batson challenge. Since the state had struck Juror 
55 there was no African American representation on the jury since there was only 
one person of that race and now there was none.  (Tr. 1/19/201, p. 92, ln. 8-25.) 
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The court stated: 
The defendant has raised a Batson challenge. The reason, I’m 
understanding, to be a possible racial prejudice issue. It’s difficult 
because this particular juror is the only one of all the jurors we had 
who’s of African-American race. [Prosecutor], I think that it falls 
upon you at this time to state facts showing why you have a neutral, 
non-racial bias reason for striking this particular juror.  
Tr. 1/19/2016, p. 93, ln. 8-16. 
The prosecutor stated as follows: 
The first reason I already articulated last week, which was 
concerning to the State, which was she indicated that she believed 
police officers were unfair to Blacks. And we have law enforcement 
testifying in this case against two African-American defendants. 
The second non-racial—non-racially derived reason that we 
exercised our preempt in this case, Your Honor, is mainly because 
she specifically said she’s going to have a difficult time focusing on 
Fridays when her 89-year old father is sitting with some stranger 
getting chemo. That’s the reason we exercised our challenge.  
We know under the schedule that we have significant detailed 
testimony coming on Friday. We’re not interested in taking any 
chance. So that’s the sole—the main primary reason in addition to 
the fact that—the reasons I’ve already articulated at our hearing 
last week.  
Tr. 1/19/2016, p. 93, ln. 17—p. 94, ln. 10. 
 Next, the following confusing exchange occurred:  
THE COURT: All right. [Mr. Robins’ counsel], speaking on behalf of 
the defense, I believe you have to argue that her excuses are 
pretext. So— 
[MR. ROBINS’ COUNSEL]: I do. 
THE COURT: Go ahead. 
[MR. ROBINS’ COUNSEL]: Judge, I’m one of those people that 
take people at their word.  
[PROSECUTOR]: So no pretexts, right?  My word or— 
[MR. ROBINS’ COUNSEL]: Your word. 
 18 
 
THE COURT:  Anything you want to say? 
[MR. DOUGLAS’ COUNSEL]: I agree.  
Tr. 1/19/2016, p. 94, ln. 11-22. 
The court ruled: 
… Well, the court on the basis of this little hearing here will 
conclude that there’s no overt racial purpose behind the strike and 
the strike will be sustained.  
Tr. 1/19/2016, p. 94, ln. 23—p. 95, ln. 1. 
 
D. The court erred in denying the Batson challenge 
This is not a case of pretext, but of a peremptory challenge being 
expressly exercised on the basis of race. The prosecutor expressly stated that 
she struck the only black juror because: 
. . . she indicated that she believed police officers were 
unfair to Blacks. And we have law enforcement testifying in 
this case against two African-American defendants. 
Tr. 1/19/2016, p. 93, ln. 19-22. 
 This reason invokes race on its face. Striking the only black juror because 
of a belief she would side with the black defendants against white police officers 
is an expressly racial basis.  
 Of course, in addition to the impermissible grounds, the prosecutor 
secondly gave a permissible race-neutral reason for striking the juror, her  
anticipated difficulty focusing when her father was at chemotherapy on Fridays.    
Regardless, since the exercise of the peremptory challenge was still motivated in 
substantial part by discriminatory intent, purposeful discrimination has been 
shown.  Accordingly, the court erred by denying the Batson challenge and Mr. 
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Mr. Douglas asserts that because he could only use the phone one hour a 
day (on a rotating schedule), he was deprived of meaningful access to his 
retained counsel from Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, because he could not reach 
him when he needed to.  
 
B.   Standard of review  
 As the constitutional error was objected to below, Mr. Douglas  carries the 
burden on appeal of establishing the error occurred.  Thereafter, the state carries 
the burden of demonstrating that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 221-222, 245 P.3d 961, 973-974 (2010); 
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824 (1967).   
 When a violation of constitutional rights is asserted, the appellate court 
defers to the district court’s findings of fact when supported by substantial 
evidence and freely reviews the lower court’s application of the facts found to the 
constitutional requirements.  State v. Anderson, 143 Idaho 743, 746, 170 P.3d 
886, 889 (2007).   
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C. The evidence and argument 
 
 On September 2, 2015, Mr. Robins and Mr. Douglas orally requested the 
district court to direct the Ada County Jail to make a reasonable accommodation 
to allow them to call their attorneys when needed as required by the Sixth 
Amendment.  (Tr. 9/2/2015, p. 17, ln. 24--p. 19, ln. 3.)  The state objected and 
requested a written motion.  (Tr. 9/2/2015, p. 19, ln. 9-21; p. 20, ln. 10.)  
 Mr. Robins filed a written motion (in which Mr. Douglas joined) to compel 
access to counsel citing his rights under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth 
Amendments of the United States Constitution and Article 1, § 13 of the Idaho 
Constitution. (R. p. 269-270, p. 279-280.) 
 In the accompanying memorandum and declaration, Mr. Robins explained 
that he was in lock down without phone access 23 hours per day.  During the 
other one hour a day, the prisoner was allowed access to the phone to contact 
his attorney and anyone else including family, to go into the exercise yard, or use 
the day room and watch TV, read books, or shower.  The one hour per day of 
phone access varied from day to day and often occurred outside of regular 
business hours when counsel could accept calls.  As a result, Mr. Robins had 
been unable to contact counsel when he needed to do so. (R. p.  R 271-272, 
274-275.)  This all applied to Mr. Douglas as well. 
 In its response, the state explained that the day room schedule  
(access to the phone) runs on a 14 day rotation beginning at 6 A.M. and 
advances one hour each day.   In other words, the earliest day room hour begins 
at 6 A.M. and the latest at 7 P.M. (R. p. 282.) The state also argued that in-
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person attorney visits were allowed by the jail 24 hours a day and that inmates 
have unlimited ability to write to counsel.  (R. p. 282.)   
 The state explained that in the 271 days that Mr. Douglas had been in the 
jail, he had dialed 525 calls out and completed 169 of them.  He called his 
original public defender twice and his retained Philadelphia attorney 91 times, but 
only 26 were answered. He dialed his local counsel 26 times, and they were 
answered 6 times.3 (R. p. 283.)  
 The state continued by arguing that because the defendants had local 
counsel and east coast counsel that the only time they could not make a phone 
call during someone’s business hours was if they were let into the day room at 5 
P.M., 6 P.M., or 7 P.M. (R. p. 284.) The state charted Mr. Douglas’ phone calls 
for the month of May, 2015, and reported that he called his Philadelphia attorney 
12 times and none of the calls were answered regardless of when they were 
made. (R. p. 285.)  
The state argued that for Mr. Douglas, it was not the phone schedule, but 
his attorney’s unavailability that caused the failure of Mr. Douglas to be able to 
contact him. (R. p. 287.)  
 Finally, the state argued that on the days when Mr. Douglas was not in the 
day room during any attorney’s business hours,  he could still write or leave 
messages to have the attorney visit him. (R.  p. 290.)   
 The court heard arguments on the motion. (Tr. 9/23/2015, p. 168, ln. 7- p. 
182, ln. 20.)  Mr. Douglas additionally argued that the state’s point that the 
                                            
3 Mr. Robins had never in his 235 days of imprisonment at the jail dialed his out 




defendants  can receive in person attorney visits 24 hours a day is hollow since 
their attorneys are in Philadelphia and cannot just fly across the country and talk 
to their clients every time they need to. (Tr. 9/23/2015, p. 172, ln. 18-25.)  
Likewise, while local counsel could theoretically visit, in this case, local counsel 
had a very limited role and, for instance, had not reviewed all the discovery 
(some 6,000 pages) so they were not able to have substantive discussions about 
the case. (Tr. 9/23/2015, p. 173, ln. 1-5.)  Accordingly, Mr. Douglas did not have 
meaningful access to his lawyer and the jail administrative policies did not trump 
the federal or state constitutions. (Tr. 9/23/2015, p. 173, ln. 14-20.)    
Finally, Mr. Douglas argued that the situation discussed in court that day 
where Mr. Douglas’ letter was stolen and Mr. Robins’ questions for his attorney 
were seized by the jail deputies and all of it was given to the prosecutor, had a 
chilling effect on letter writing. (Tr. 9/23/2015, p. 182, ln. 9-14.) 
Following the arguments, the court denied the motion stating that while it 
had not seen any cases specifically addressing this type of situation, it did not 
think that there was a constitutional violation.  (Tr. 9/23/2015, p. 182, ln. 24—p. 
183, ln. 2.) The court stated that it was just a matter of “attorneys and clients 
making sure that their schedules are in proper order.”  (Tr. 9/23/2015, p. 183, ln. 
3-5.)   
 
D.  The court erred by denying the motion for access to counsel 
 “The right to the effective assistance of counsel at trial is a bedrock 
principle in our justice system.”  Martinez v. Ryan, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 1309, 
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1317 (2012).  “[I]t is well settled that the right to counsel means the right to 
effective assistance of counsel. . . .”  State v. Ruth, 102 Idaho 638, 642, 637 P.2d 
415, 419 (1981), citing State v. Clayton, 100 Idaho 896, 606 P.2d 1000 (1980); 
State v. Tucker, 97 Idaho 4, 539 P.2d 556 (1975).  Effective assistance requires 
the ability to communicate with the client.  See Baldayaque v. United States, 338 
F.3d 145, 152 (2d Cir. 2003).  
 The requirements for a fair trial include an opportunity for meaningful 
consultation with counsel.  Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 137, 112 S.Ct. 
1810, 1816 (1992); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 
2066 (1984); Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 91, 96 S.Ct. 1330, 1336 
(1976); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 57, 53 S.Ct. 55, 59 (1932).  The further 
principles underlying all these holdings is that the government may not impose 
any unnecessary restriction or impediment to the exercise of such rights, Geders, 
supra, and that trial judges must affirmatively safeguard those rights.  Turner v. 
Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 36, 106 S.Ct. 1683, 1688 (1986); Dusky v. United States, 
362 U.S. 402, 80 S.Ct. 788 (1960).  
 In this case, the jail interfered with an opportunity for meaningful 
consultation with counsel by limiting Mr. Douglas’ phone access to one hour a 
day, at times during hours outside of business hours.  During this one hour a day, 
Mr. Douglas needed to take a shower, exercise, and speak to his family, in 
addition to conferring with his attorney.   
The alternative means of communication like in person visits and mail 
were not sufficient.    Primary trial counsel’s office was in Philadelphia making 
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regular in-person visit impracticable.  While local counsel could go to the jail 
when counsel had an issue to discuss with the client, counsel cannot know other 
than by a phone call that the jailed client has an issue he wants to discuss.  Of 
course, even if local counsel did know that the client wanted a visit, as argued, 
local counsel could not engage in substantive discussions so his ability to have in 
person visits did not help matters.  
Likewise, mail is no substitute for the phone in a case like this with 
massive discovery and sophisticated legal analysis.  Further, writing a letter 
which then goes out as legal mail to Philadelphia to try and arrange a phone call 
is unwieldly at best. Nor is the writing of letters something Mr. Douglas would 
reasonably do here since his letter had been stolen and handed over to the state 
and Mr. Robins’ legal work taken.  
 The court also looked to the ability of counsel to schedule their time – the 
implication being that counsel should organize their days in accord with the jail 
one hour release schedules so that during that hour counsel would be waiting by 
the phone in case Mr. Douglas attempted to call.  This is an unworkable 
resolution.  No attorney can set aside one movable hour every day to wait by the 
phone for a call from the jailed client.  
Finally, the state’s argument that the problem was that counsel was not 
answering Mr. Douglas’ calls shows that the system in place was not in fact 
working.  Mr. Douglas obviously needed more opportunity to call his lawyer, not 
the same opportunity which did not result in his communicating with counsel. 
 In short, the inconvenience to the sheriff of allowing Mr. Douglas more 
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opportunities to call his Pennsylvania lawyer pales in comparison to the 
deprivation of Mr. Douglas’ Sixth Amendment right of access to counsel. 
 Thus, Mr. Douglas’ constitutional right to access to counsel was violated, 
and the court erred by finding otherwise.  In addition, the court abused its 
discretion in failing to fashion a remedy because it (1) did not perceive the issue 
as one of discretion; (2) consequently, it failed to act within the boundaries of its 
discretion and consistently with legal standards applicable to specific choices; 
and (3) it failed reached its decision by an exercise of reason.  Taylor v. 
McNichols, 149 Idaho 826, 243 P.3d 642 (2010). 
 Given there was a violation and an objection below, the burden is upon 
the state to prove harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt.  Perry, supra; 
Chapman, supra.  Unless the state can prove harmlessness, this Court must 
reverse Mr. Douglas’ convictions as he was denied his right to access to counsel.   
 
III. 
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE MOTION FOR MISTRIAL  
A.  Standard of review 
 The standard of review was explained by the Idaho Supreme Court in 
State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 165 P.3d 273 (2007): 
When there is a motion for mistrial based upon prosecutorial error 
supported by a contemporaneous objection to the underlying 
procedural or evidentiary error we review the denial of a motion for 
mistrial for reversible error.  
 
[T]he question on appeal is not whether the trial judge 
reasonably exercised his discretion in light of circumstances 
existing when the mistrial motion was made. Rather, the 
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question must be whether the event which precipitated the 
motion for mistrial represented reversible error when viewed 
in the context of the full  record. Thus, where a motion for 
mistrial has been denied in a criminal case, the "abuse of 
discretion" standard is a misnomer. The standard, more 
accurately stated, is one of reversible error. Our focus is 
upon the continuing impact on the trial of the incident that 
triggered the mistrial motion. The trial judge's refusal to 
declare a mistrial will be disturbed only if that incident, 
viewed retrospectively, constituted reversible error. 
 
Id. p. 571 (internal citations omitted). 
 
B. The motion and the court’s ruling 
 
 Officer Ransom was testifying in one of the many times he was called. On 
direct, he was discussing a burner phone from Pennsylvania and that the 
airplane passenger associated with that number was Mr. Douglas. (Tr. 
1/25/2016, p. 258, ln. 1-9.)  
Q. Okay. And is this the first time you had seen this number 
associated to this flight record when you get it?  
 
A.  Yes, ma’am.  
 
Q.  Okay. So, at that point, tell us how you tried to figure out who 
John C. Douglas is. 
 
A.  We had obviously previously received some information that 
that person was associated with Pennsylvania. Also, there 
had been—we’d received a call from, I believe, a DEA agent 
from back East who said that they had a CI who had 
mentioned a murder in Boise. Sorry. Confidential informant 
who mentioned a murder in Boise and said that the person  
was possibly living in Redington, Pennsylvania-- 
 
MR. MCMAHON: Objection, Your Honor. 
 
THE WITNESS:--or Allentown, Pennsylvania. 
 
MR. MCMAHON: Objection. Can we see you sidebar? 
Tr. 5/17/2011, p. 260, ln. 21—p. 261, ln. 13. 
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 After the side bar the court excused the jury and the defense moved for a 
mistrial.  
 The defense argued inter alia, as follows: 
What that has, in effect, done, Your Honor, has allowed the jury to 
hear that an unnamed, unknown  person who’s an informant for a 
drug agency has identified my client as a participant in the—or 
related to the homicide in Boise, Idaho. And our defense obviously 
is that he didn’t do this. And now, they have that testimony before 
the jury. 
 
I don’t know who this person is.  I don’t—I can’t cross examine him. 
It’s hearsay.  It’s for all those reasons—and it’s extraordinarily 
prejudicial.  It’s just not some minor hearsay.  It goes to the 
essence of the defense that it’s not this particular individual. And 
they have established through inadmissible, confidential informant 
hearsay that my client is involved in this incident.  
 
Now I can say this: I am reluctantly moving for a mistrial after all 
this time in the trial.  But nevertheless, it is to me at this point 
mandated that a mistrial be granted as to Mr. Douglas because you 
can’t cure that, that a confidential informant has indicated that my 
client is a participant in this murder.  
 
There’s no way that Mr. Douglas can get a fair—continuing on with 
this--a fair shake as to whether he’s the person or not without 
that—with that testimony being there.  
 
And again, a lot of times, we can tell juries to forget certain things. 
But when it’s of the fundamental issue of the case, it would be 
absurd to think that we can just tell them to forget that you heard a 
DEA confidential informant say my guy is guilty.  
 
Tr. 1/25/16, p. 262, ln. 23—p. 265, ln.  2. 
 
 The state argued that the CI did not specifically say that Mr. Douglas 
committed the murder. Also, the state pointed out that it was not happy about the 
testimony either and it didn’t intend it to happen because it was unresponsive. 
(Tr. 1/25/2016, p. 265, ln. 1-12.)  The state argued that striking the testimony and 
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giving a curative instruction was a sufficient remedy. (Tr. 1/25/2016, p. 265, ln. 
13-19.) 
The defense countered that you cannot unring a bell and that given the 
testimony and essentially what was known about Mr. Douglas at that point in the 
trial, the testimony clearly implicated him in the murder.  (Tr. 1/25/2016, p. 265, 
ln. 19—p. 266, ln. 8.) 
The court ruled as follows: 
. . .  Well first of all, the statement in issue was unresponsive and, 
frankly  is double hearsay and can and should be stricken from the 
record under all circumstances.  
 
I don’t agree with the defense that its so highly prejudicial that it 
requires a mistrial. I do believe the jury can be instructed to 
disregard it and not consider it in their deliberations. I do believe 
that the jury will follow that instruction.  
 
And so, the motion for mistrial will be denied, the objection will be 
sustained.  
 
Tr. 1/25/2016, p. 267, ln. 17—p. 268, ln. 2.  
 
The court instructed the jury as follows: 
 
All right. Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, before we broke, there 
was some testimony quite frankly that was nonresponsive and 
double hearsay. You are advised and informed that that testimony 
has been stricken from the record, you are to disregard it and you 
are not to consider it for any purposes in the course of your 
deliberations. We’ll have a written instruction on this when we do 
the final instructions as well.  
 
Tr. 1/25/2016, p. 268, ln. 22—p. 269, ln. 4.4 
                                            







C.  The court erred by denying the motion for mistrial 
 The defense attorney’s point was valid. This was not police volunteered 
testimony on a  tangential issue. Rather, it was direct evidence of the ultimate 
issue, whether Mr. Douglas committed the murders in Boise or not.  Further, it 
inserted the DEA into the mix.  While there was evidence that others may well 
have been trafficking in controlled substances, there was none that Mr. Douglas 
was. Jeanette Juraska testified she had seen Mr. Douglas at a medical marijuana 
trim house in California. (Tr. 1/22/2016, p. 51, ln. 10-18.)  Yet now the jury was 
told that he was significant enough to be part of a DEA investigation.  
 Further, the curative instruction was, as defense counsel argued, 
insufficient to actually have the jury members put the evidence that Mr. Douglas 
was  a murderer and drug trafficker out of their minds. 
 Accordingly, the court erred by denying the motion for mistrial. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 Mr. Douglas requests this Court reverse and vacate his convictions and 
remand this matter for a new trial.  
DATED this 12th day of June, 2017.      
 
        
/s/ Greg S. Silvey                                  
     Greg S. Silvey 
     Attorney for Appellant 
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